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Much has been said and written about the changes in choice of law
wrought over the course of the last three decades. Since the New York
Court of Appeals' 1963 landmark decision in Babcock v. Jackson,' it is
generally accepted that the United States has undergone a "conflicts revo-
lution."' 2 The conflicts literature is replete with exhaustive reviews of the
"revolutionary" case law.3
It is clear beyond peradventure that the American choice-of-law vocab-
ulary has changed dramatically. Until 1963 the Restatement (First) of
Conflict of Laws (the First Restatement) commanded a nearly universal
following. 4 Grounded in the conceptual edifice of the "vested rights" theory,
the First Restatement chose the lex loci delicti, or the law of the place of
the injury, in tort cases. 5 Now, only fifteen of the fifty-one United States
jurisdictions still follow the First Restatement in tort cases, while thirty-six
states have adopted some alternative. 6 Instead of looking for the place of
the injury, these thirty-six jurisdictions rationalize their choice-of-law deci-
sions in terms of "interests," 7 "significant relationships, ' 8 and "choice-
influencing considerations. " 9
* Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University. Thanks to
Richard Platkin and Cor Kaplan for their outstanding research help, and to Fritz Juenges
and Michael Solimine for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
2. See, e.g., Gary J. Simson, Introduction: New Directions in Choice of Law: Alter-
natives to Interest Analysis, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 195 (1991).
3. See, e.g., TH. M. DE BOER, BEYoND LEx Loci DELiCTi (1987); Herma H. Kay,
Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. Rzv. 521 (1983); Harold
L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 CoLuM. L. REv. 772 (1983); Gregory
E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTiNGs L.J. 1041 (1987).
4. Friedrich K. Juenger, General Course on Private International Law, 193 REcuBIL
DES CouRs D'AcAEMIE DE DRorr INTERNATONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 123, 220-21 (1985).
5. RESTATEMENT (FrsT) OF CoNIucT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) (stating that law applied in
tort cases is place of last event necessary to complete tort).
6. See infra Table II.
7. BRAiNERD CtRnuE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 90 (1963).
8. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
9. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 267 (1966).
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Wide differences now exist between state courts as to what they say
about choice of law. But, as Walter Wheeler Cook once enjoined lawyers,
what courts do, not what they say, is important.' 0 With that injunction
firmly in mind, I set out to conduct this empirical study of the conflicts
revolution."
Despite the undeniable realignment in choice of law, important questions
remain concerning the depth of the changes and the relative merits of the
competing modern approaches. One obvious question is the magnitude of
the change actually effected by the revolution. Although the lex loci delicti
rule is often thought of as inflexible, in practice certain "escape devices"
allow for manipulation.' 2 Another important question is whether and to
what degree the modern theories differ among themselves. Although choice-
of-law theories have sparked fierce doctrinal battles between their propo-
nents, 3 others have noted that in practice the courts follow a more temperate
route of borrowing from many of the "new"' 4 theories and reaching results
consistent with many proposals. 5
10. Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 457, 460 (1924); see also Kay, supra note 3, at 523 (citing Cook but placing more
emphasis on purported methodologies of courts).
11. There has been one other empirical study of choice of law. See Michael E. Solimine,
An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REv. 49 (1989). The focus
of Professor Solimine's study is different, however. First, he grouped all of the various modem
approaches together, and compared the results to the First Restatement. Id. at 83-85. In this
survey, by contrast, I attempt to evaluate not only the differences between the modem
approaches and the First Restatement but also the differences between the competitors. Second,
Professor Solimine counted only appellate cases from 1970, while I counted all reported cases
as far back as 1960. Accordingly, my data base consisted of over 800 cases, a bit over three
times the size of Professor Solimine's. Id. at 85. Third, Professor Solimine concentrated his
statistical analysis on the significance of the correlation between departure from the First
Restatement and certain geographical and social characteristics of the states, id. at 83, while
this study concentrates on the statistical significance of variations in the result patterns. Yet,
in spite of the difference between the two studies, where they overlap they confirm each other.
For instance, Professor Solimine found that state supreme courts applying the First Restatement
from 1970 to 1988 chose prorecovery rules in 45% of the cases. Id. at 83. For all state courts
applying the First Restatement since 1960, I found that state courts chose prorecovery rules
in 40 ± 12% of the cases. See infra Table IV.
12. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 528 (N.Y. 1961);
Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218, 223-24 (Cal. 1955); Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co.,
95 N.W.2d 814, 818-19 (Wis. 1959).
13. See, e.g., Bralnerd Currie, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
1233, 1235-43 (1963) (criticizing "center of gravity" and Second Restatement approaches);
Herma H. Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation
of the California Experience, 68 CAL. L. REv. 577, 604-10 (1980) (criticizing California's
adoption of Baxter's "comparative impairment" solution to true conflicts as opposed to
Currie's choice of forum law).
14. Actually, none of the "new" theories are really very new. One historical investigation
has concluded that all of the currently competing choice-of-law methodologies have visible
roots as far back as the fourteenth century. Juenger, supra note 4, at 142-44 (tracing all three
major schools to glossators).
15. Robert A. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROas. 10, 11-21 (Spring, 1977).
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In order to determine, therefore, the depth of the change actually
effected by the revolution, it is necessary to identify some variables to gauge
the change. Commentators have made various assertions regarding the actual
operation of the new choice-of-law theories. Most frequently these assertions
center on the perception that the new theories are "pro-resident, pro-forum
law and pro-recovery."
1 6
To find out whether this perception is correct, I decided to study the
propensity of each conflicts methodology to apply forum law, prorecovery
rules and rules that favor local parties. For states still following the First
Restatement, I surveyed all reported decisions, both trial and appellate,
state and federal, since 1960. For states following a new methodology, I
canvassed all reported decisions, trial and appellate, state and federal, since
the states adopted the new approach. My search yielded a total data base
of 802 decisions. In Part I of this Article, I briefly review the choice-of-
law approaches currently competing in the United States. In Part II, I
report the results of the study. In Part III, I draw conclusions from the
data.
I. CHOICE-OF-LAW METHODOLOGIES
Until the early 1960s, the First Restatement had a nearly monolithic
following in the United States. This restatement, reported by Professor
Joseph Beale, was completed in 1934.'1 The First Restatement was firmly
grounded in the multilateralist theory of choice of law.' 8 That approach
attempts to derive solutions to conflicts problems by laying down choice-
of-law norms external to the forum's substantive law. 9 These "jurisdiction-
selecting" 20 rules select the governing state's laws independently of the
content of the substantive rules competing for application.
Although in the United States Professor Beale's name is most frequently
associated with this approach, he certainly did not invent the multilateralist
methodology. 21 Beale grounded his version of multilateralism in the "vested
16. See Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH.
L. Rev. 392, 398 (1980). Some have even asserted that these tendencies are so pronounced as
to render some of the new theories unconstitutional. See, e.g., John H. Ely, Choice of Law
and the State's Interest in Protecting its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173, 180-85 (1981)
(observing that interest analysis's propensity to favor local parties violates Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
17. Juenger, supra note 4, at 208.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 168.
20. David Cavers invented the term "jurisdiction-selecting." See David F. Cavers, A
Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. Rev. 173, 194 (1933).
21. Juenger, supra note 4, at 157 (noting that although multilateralist approach has much
more ancient roots, its modem origin probably traces to Dutch jurist Huber). Although less
influential in Europe, Huber's writings heavily influenced Joseph Story, the great Supreme
Court justice and Dane Professor of Law at Harvard. Id. at 157. Story published the first
edition of his legendary Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws in 1834. JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARmIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834). Although Beale's outlook was considerably
more parochial than Story's, Beale recognized his debt to Story by dedicating his treatise to
Story. JOSEPH BEA.E, I A TREArISE ON TE COnfliCT OF LAWS ii (1935).
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rights" theory.22 Beale postulated that the forum court's role in a multistate
dispute is not to apply foreign law but, rather, to enforce existing legal
rights created under the foreign law.23 He hypothesized that the power to
create rights belonged to the place where the last event necessary to create
liability occurred. In tort cases this last event principle necessarily calls for
application of the law of the place of the injury.24
Even before it was completed, however, the First Restatement came
under heavy fire, principally from the legal realists. Two influential and
early critics were David Cavers and Walter Wheeler Cook. Cavers-Beale's
former pupil-criticized the First Restatement for selecting the applicable
law based upon factors independent of the substantive content of the rules
competing for application. 25 Cook attacked the First Restatement at its
roots. Unwittingly restating the century-old criticisms of European com-
mentators,26 Cook demonstrated that the "vested rights" theory was circular
because it assumed precisely what it was designed to prove, for example,
that territorial connecting factors control the choice of the applicable law
in multistate cases. 27
For a considerable length of time, the First Restatement's critics were
content to attack it without proposing an alternative. 2 However, in a series
of law review articles penned in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the late
Brainerd Currie wove the fabric of his "governmental interest analysis," 29
an approach that would ultimately come to be seen as "the first real
alternative" to the First Restatement. ° Currie postulated that each and
every rule of positive state law, whether embodied in a judicial decision or
statute, represents a singular state "policy."'" This was true, apparently,
even for outmoded and antiquated rules, such as the denial of contractual
capacity to married women and the nonsurvival of tort liability. 3? From
these policies spring "interests." 33 Currie argued that these policies and
interests can be determined from the normal processes of statutory construc-
tion.34 Consequently, Currie invariably adopted the following methodology:
Each statute or common-law rule represents a singular state policy, and the
22. BEALE, supra note 21, at 53.
23. Id. at 64.
24. E.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) (noting that place of
last event necessary to create tort provides governing substantive law).
25. Cavers, supra note 20, at 194.
26. Kurt H. Nadelman, Wdchter's Essay on the Collision of Private Laws of Different
States, 13 AM. J. Comp. L. 414 (1963) (translating 1842 essay by Carl G. von Wichter).
27. WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 17-18
(1942).
28. Id. at ix (asserting that primary purpose was "weedling]" "garden" of conflicts).
29. Most of these articles on interest analysis are collected in CURIE, supra note 7.
30. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 43 (1991).
31. CURRIE, supra note 7, at 183-84.
32. Id. at 85, 144.
33. Id. at 47-48.
34. Id. at 183-84.
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state has an "interest" in applying that policy in favor of the state's
domiciliaries.35
The adoption of the domiciliary nexus, and substantial elimination of
territorial connecting factors, brought about a marked departure from the
First Restatement. Under Currie's approach, conflicts cases fall into three
categories: True conflicts, false conflicts and unprovided-for cases.3 6 False
conflicts occur only if the parties have a common domicile.3 7 In such cases,
only one state has an "interest" in having its law applied, because only
one domiciliary will be aided by application of her state's laws.38 In these
cases, Currie recommended applying the law of the only interested state-
the state of the common domicile. 9 If the parties hail from different states,
however, -either a true conflict or an unprovided-for case arises. 4° True
conflicts occur when the application of two or more state's laws will benefit
those states' domiciliaries, while unprovided-for cases occur when no dom-
iciliary will benefit from the application of her state's law.41 In either case,
Currie recommended applying forum law on the. grounds that the problem
was insoluble, and, thus, no good reason existed to displace the application
of forum law. 42 Because cases are usually litigated" in the home state of one
or both of the parties, interest analysis is essentially a mandate to apply
forum law unless the parties have a common domicile in a state other than
the forum.
43
Much of the credit or blame-depending upon one's perspective-for
the conflicts revolution must go to Currie. His essays, as one commentator
would state later, were "so seductive in style that [they] appearH to have
hypnotized a generation of American lawyers.""4 Currie, however, was not
alone in his later-day criticism of the First Restatement. When New York,
in Babcock v. Jackson,45 became the first American jurisdiction to break
explicitly from the lex loci delicti rule in tort cases, fully six commentators
were able to share the limelight and find support for their theories in
Babcock's cryptic phrases and far-reaching implications.46 This diversity of
35. Patrick J. Borchers, Professor Brilmayer and the Holy Grail, 1991 Wis. L. REv.





40. Currie, supra note 13, at 1234.
41. Borchers, supra note 35, at 471.
42. CuRitm, supra note 7, at 167.
43. See Juenger, supra note 4, at 217.
44. Korn, supra note 3, at 812.
45. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
46. The Columbia Law Review presented a symposium on Babcock shortly after the
decision. David F. Cavers et al., Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development
in the Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1963). The contributors were David F.
Cavers, Elliott E. Cheatham, Brainerd Currie, Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Robert A. Leflar and
Willis L.M. Reese. Id.
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opinion spawned several modern competitors to interest analysis, two of
which have earned a substantial following among American courts.
One of Currie 's important competitors was the American Law Institute
(ALI), which under the direction of reporter Willis Reese set out to draft
a Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (the Second Restatement).
Completed in 1971, the Second Restatement is a thoroughly eclectic docu-
ment, 47 but it bears Reese's mark. As early as' 1952, Reese, with coauthor
Elliott Cheatham, argued for a "checklist" approach to multistate prob-
lems.48 This article argued that a court should exercise a mild presumption
in favor of applying forum law, but the choice of forum law could be
rebutted by the application of a multifactor analysis.49 Included in this
analysis are the need to advance local purposes, certainty, predictability,
uniformity of result, protection of justified expectations, furthering the
policies of the state with the dominant interest and ease of application.
With Currie,5" Ehrenzweig,52 and others arguing passionately against
adoption, the Second Restatement brought to bear the ALI's authority in
support of a choice-of-law approach much in the mold of the earlier
Cheatham and Reese proposal. The Second Restatement contains two general
sections that bear on choice of law in torts cases. The first is section 6,
which provides that in the absence of a statutory directive:
The factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law
include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.53
More specifically, section 145 provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue
in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with
47. Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34
MERCER L. REV. 501, 508 (1983) (describing Second Restatement as eclectic). Reese, the
Reporter for the Second Restatement, stated that it was "eclectic in nature [because it] relilies]
on a variety of different theories and values." Id.
48. Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM.
L. REV. 959 (1952).
49. Id. at 964.
50. Id. at 981.
51. Currie, supra note 13, at 1235-43.
52. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for its
Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230 (1965).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in section 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles
of section 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.5
Another major competitor of Currie was Robert A. Leflar. Like Currie,
Leflar set forth his proposal in a series of law review articles published
around the time of the commencement of the conflicts revolution.5 5 Like
the Second Restatement, Leflar set forth his factors in an unweighted,. open-
ended form. As Leflar identified them, the five "choice-influencing consid-
erations" are:
(A) Predictability of results;
(B) Maintenance of interstate and international order;
(C) Simplification of the judicial task;
(D) Advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
(E) Application of the better rule of law5
6
Superficially at least, each of the four dominant approaches-the First
Restatement, the Second Restatement, interest analysis and Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations-differ markedly from one another. Both the
First and Second Restatements are cast in the mold of multilateralism
because of their basic methodology of interposing choice-of-law rules based
upon the legal category to which the dispute belongs.5 7 To be sure, the First
Restatement's multilateralism is more rigid and pure. But even though the
Second Restatement makes room for such considerations as "the relevant
policies of the interested states" and relies upon "soft" connecting factors,
it is primarily multilateralist and territorial in its outlook, especially in tort
cases. 58 In stark contrast, Currie's interest analysis is almost classically
unilateralist. 59 Instead of attempting to link transactions to legal systems by
54. RESTATEMrN (SEcoND) OF CoNrIcT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
55. See, e.g., Leflar, supra note 9; Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1584 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar, More Consider-
ations].
56. Leflar, supra note 9, at 279; Leflar, More Considerations, supra note 55, at
1586-88.
57. Juenger, supra note 4, at 220.
58.. Id.
59. DE BOER, supra note 3, at 1-5 (arguing that Currie's method is "neo-statutist");
1992]
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means of connecting factors, interest analysis assumes that some spatial
dimension can be ascribed to rules of decision. 60 By making the fundamental
assumption that a state promulgates substantive rules primarily for the
benefit of its domiciliaries, Currie's approach prefers the personal law
principle to territorial connecting factors.6 ' Leflar's approach, which in tort
cases relies primarily upon the "better law" consideration,6 is neither
multilateralist nor unilateralist. Leflar's approach is "teleological" or
"substantive" 63 because it looks not to connecting factors, whether personal
or territorial, but instead to the merits of the competing rules.6
For analytical purposes, then, let us begin with a tentative hypothesis.
It is a hypothesis that I ultimately believe to be false, but analytically useful
nonetheless. The tentative hypothesis is that courts take these choice-of-law
approaches seriously and make a sincere effort to follow their dictates.
If one accepts this hypothesis the four different approaches should yield
different patterns of results in tort cases. Of course, there are some-
perhaps many-cases in which all or some of the approaches will produce
the same result.65 Nevertheless, assuming the approaches are applied faith-
fully, one can make some predictions as to their affinity for forum, plaintiff-
favoring and local-favoring rules.
The First Restatement's outstanding characteristic is its evenhandness.6
By making the applicable law in tort cases depend upon the place of the
Juenger, supra note 4, at 215 (noting that Currie was "modem unilateralist"). But see Herma
H. Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 Recueil des Cours
d'Academie de Droit International 12, 46 (1989) (arguing that Currie's method differs from
unilateralism in important respects).
60. Currie, supra note 13, at 1234 (observing that spatial reach of legal rules can be
determined through ordinary processes of construction and interpretation).
61. Borchers, supra note 35, at 471.
62. Robert A. Leflar, Choice of Law: States' Rights, 10 HoFSTRA L. REv. 203, 209-10
(1981).
63. Juenger, supra note 4, at 219.
64. Borchers, supra note 35, at 468 n.19.
65. For instance, in a case such as Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963),
in which the New York Court of Appeals applied its rule of ordinary negligence instead of
the Ontario guest statute to a case involving an Ontario one-car accident, at least three of the
four approaches would have reached the same result. Interest analysis calls for application of
New York law because both of the parties were New York domiciliaries, leaving New York
as the only interested jurisdiction. See Currie, supra note 13, at 1234. Leflar's approach calls
for application of New York law primarily because of the undoubted superiority of the New
York full recovery rule. Robert A. Leflar, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L.
R . 1247, 1248-49 (1963). The Second Restatement, or "grouping of contacts" approach,
which was apparently applied by the Court of Appeals, calls for application of New York law
because the only contact with Ontario of significance was the accident, while contacts with
New York were plentiful. Willis L.M. Reese, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLuM.
L. Ray. 1251, 1254-55 (1963). Even the First Restatement, which normally would have called
for application of Ontario law because Ontario was the situs of the accident, might have been
bent to accommodate application of New York law. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 528-29 (N.Y. 1961) (displaying "offensive" use of public policy doctrine
to avoid application of Massachusetts wrongful death damage limitation).
66. Juenger, supra note 4, at 218 (noting "urbane neutrality" of First Restatement).
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injury, no apparent reason exists why the First Restatement should favor
any particular type of substantive rule. Because the place of the injury is a
random event, the First Restatement should not be expected to produce
forum, plaintiff-favoring or local-favoring outcomes. This prediction, how-
ever, must be tempered by at least one observation. The First Restatement
came equipped with several escape devices, at least two of which are
applicable in tort cases. The first device is the ability to recharacterize
apparently "substantive" tort issues as matters of procedure and thereby
take advantage of the forum rule. 67 The second is the "public policy"
exception, which in later years was molded by the courts to allow for use
by plaintiffs to avoid obnoxious foreign rules excusing or limiting liability.6
Application of these escape devices might give the First Restatement a slight
preference for forum and Tecovery-favoring rules, but, even so, the First
Restatement's approach is remarkably neutral on its face.
Even assuming that courts take the Second Restatement seriously, it is
much more difficult to predict the likely results. As one writer observed,
"[a]lthough printed in black letters, [the Second Restatement's tort provi-
sion] is not much of a rule. ' 69 Nonetheless, the Second Restatement shares
many of the neutral features of the First Restatement. By making territorial
connecting factors the thrust of its approach in tort cases, 70 the Second
Restatement should be expected to be partially immune to preferences for
forum, plaintiff-favoring or local-favoring rules. However, that immunity
is not complete. Two of the factors in section 6 plainly indicate a preference
for forum law. Both factor (b)-"the relevant policies of the forum"-and
factor (g)-"ease in determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied"-point toward forum law. Moreover, factor (c), which was designed
to accommodate a measure of interest analysis, probably imports some of
that methodology's preference for forum law. On the whole, therefore, the
Second Restatement should show a stronger preference for forum law than
the First Restatement. Along with the preference for forum law should go
a mild preference for recovery-favoring rules. Although limitations on
personal jurisdiction do not allow for unlimited choice of fora, 71 in interstate
cases plaintiffs have an opportunity to forum shop. One would expect
plaintiffs to file cases in states having favorable substantive rules, provided
those states have a preference for applying their own law. 72 Finally, the
67. See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (Cal. 1953).
68. See, e.g., Kilberg, 172 N.E.2d at 528.
69. Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 202,
212 (1969) (footnote omitte).
70. The Second Restatement employs the place of injury rule for many important tort
issues. EUGENE F. ScoLFs & PETER HAY, CoN.zIcT -oF LAWS 588-89 (1982).
71. For a discussion of the current state of the law of personal jurisdiction, see generally
Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. Rn-v. 19 (1990).
72. This observation is not original. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic
and International, 63 TuL. L. Rv. 553, 559 (1989); Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 398-99.
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Second Restatement should not favor local over nonlocal parties. None of
the factors in either section 6 or section 145 make any overt distinctions
between locals and nonlocals.
In contrast to the First Restatement's "urbane neutrality" and the
relative neutrality of the Second Restatement, interest analysis is "unabash-
edly parochial. '73 Two features stand out immediately. The first is that the
fundamental assumption that laws are enacted for the benefit of local parties
is bound to favor local parties over nonlocals. 74 In fact, one commentator
has argued for this reason that interest analysis unconstitutionally discrim-
inates against nonlocal parties. 75 The second feature is that by requiring
application of forum law in all cases except those in which the parties have
a common domicile outside the state, interest analysis should favor appli-
cation of forum law. 76 This forum bias should entail a preference for
recovery-favoring rules because of the incentive to forum shop for favorable
substantive rules.77 Weighing against these preferences is the fact that courts
tend not to apply interest analysis in its pure form but opt for slight
variations on the theme. 78 California, for instance, resolves true conflicts
not by the blunt forum law preference Currie advocated, but by a "com-
parative impairment" approach that calls on courts to determine which of
the two competing policies would be most greatly injured if denied appli-
cation.79 These admixtures probably dilute the strong preferences for forum
and local-favoring rules inherent in the methodology. Nevertheless, interest
analysis, applied faithfully in almost any form, should strongly favor forum
and local-favoring rules and less strongly favor recovery-favoring rules.
Finally, Leflar's approach reveals some clear tendencies as well. By
relying substantially on the "better law" consideration in tort cases, Leflar's
approach undoubtedly must favor plaintiffs. Although there are some
examples of substantive tort rules that are excessively favorable to plain-
tiffs, 0 most of the fodder for the conflicts revolution was substandard,
defendant-favoring tort rules such as interspousal immunity, guest statutes,
contributory negligence and wrongful death damage limitations.8 Leflar's
approach also should strongly favor forum law.8 2 In cases in which the
73. Juenger, supra note 4, at 218.
74. Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 398-99.
75. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 16, at 180-91.
76. Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 399.
77. Id.
78. Kay, supra note 59, at 184-85.
79. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 859 (1976).
80. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(noting that emotional distress and punitive damages are available for wrongful employment
termination even for expressly at-will employees), disapproved by Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
81. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); see also infra notes
134-37.
82. ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 70, at 31 (observing that better law is almost invariably
forum law).
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relevant forum rule is judge-made, the courts are likely to view their own
work product as better. 3 In cases in which the relevant forum rule is
legislative, there is probably a less consistent view among the state judiciary
as to its wisdom, but there is still likely to be some preference for the
familiar forum rule. Leflar's theory does not rely exclusively on the better
law factor in tort cases; the "governmental interest" factor also plays a
role.Y To the degree that interests are a factor in Leflar's theory, this
should do nothing to diminish the propensity to favor forum and recovery
rules, because interest analysis is tilted in those directions as well.'- With
regard to favoring local over nonlocal parties, Leflar's approach is relatively
blind. Determination of the better rule has no necessary interrelationship
with the domicile of the parties. The interest factor must favor locals
somewhat, 6 but the better law determinant should dilute this. significantly.
To summarize, Table I shows the apparent preferences of the competing
conflicts approaches in tort cases.
TABLE I-APPAENT PREFERENCES OF CONnICTS APPROACHES
First Rest. Second Rest. Intrst. Anal. Leflar
Forum None Mild Strong Strong
Law
Recovery- None Mild Mild Strong
Favoring
Local None None Strong Mild
Parties
II. THm STuDy
It is one thing to speculate about how the various conflicts theories
might operate in practice and quite another to determine their actual
operation. With the second goal in mind, I set out to study, as comprehen-
sively as possible, the results generated in tort cases by the competing
conflicts approaches.
The first step in the study was to identify the approach that a
state purports to follow.87 For some states this proved to be a fairly simple
83. Robert A. Sedler, Professor Juenger's Challenge to the Interest Analysis Approach
to Choice-of-Law: An Appreciation and a Response, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. Rnv. 865, 894 (1990).
84. Leflar, supra note 62, at 209-10.
85. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
87. There have been other surveys of the approaches that courts purport to follow, but
the pace with which states have changed their approach renders any such survey at least
partially obsolete in a matter of a few years. For instance, Professor Kay in a 1983 survey
reported that 22 states follow the First Restatement. Kay, supra note 3, at 591-92. In a 1988
survey, Mr. Smith found that 18 states follow the First Restatement in torts cases. Smith,
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task,88 but others presented more challenges. Some states-New York being
the most striking example-clearly reject the First Restatement, but their
approaches have overtones of many of the competing approaches and have
frequently changed during the postrevolutionary period. 89 Other states ex-
plicitly combine two or more of the competing approaches.9 The resulting
permutations led Professor Kay to conclude that American courts follow as
many as ten distinct approaches. 9' Recognizing that number of approaches,
however, would greatly reduce the survey's statistical value by shrinking the
size of each data base.
Fortunately, only eleven jurisdictions-Arkansas, the District of Colum-
bia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island-presented significant classification
issues. A careful study of the reported opinions revealed that eight of these
jurisdictions fit reasonably comfortably into one of the three new theories-
the Second Restatement, Leflar's choice-influencing considerations or inter-
est analysis. 92 Although classification difficulties remain, and there is room
for debate with respect to the problematic jurisdictions, these issues were
marginal in terms of the overall effect on the survey.
After classifying the states, I collected as many reported conflicts
decisions as possible. Generally, I accomplished this with computer searches,
though in some cases the data base did not extend far enough back in time.
In these instances I employed more traditional research methods. The study
thus included both appellate decisions and trial court decisions, if reported.
Also included were reported federal district court cases and decisions of the
circuit courts of appeals, which under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co.93 purport to adhere to their home state's choice-of-law
methodology. Despite Klaxon, there are some notable examples of federal
supra note 3, at 1174. Updating her own research in 1989, Professor Kay found that 16 states
follow the First Restatement. Kay, supra note 59, at 182. A 1989 survey by Professors Kozyris
and Symeonides found that 16 states follow the First Restatement in torts cases and 13 follow
it in contracts cases. P. John Kozyris & Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 AM. J. Comp. L. 601, 602-04 (1990). Without
differentiating between tort and contract, Professor Solimine found that 14 states adhere to
the First Restatement as of 1989. Solimine, supra note 11, at 54-55. All of this makes clear
that classifying states as to their choice-of-law approach is more art than science.
88. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 207-09 (N.H. 1966) (adopting Leflar's
approach).
89. See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 683-84 (N.Y. 1985)
(describing New York approach as one of "interest analysis"); Cousins v. Instrument Flyers,
Inc., 376 N.E.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. 1978) (noting that lex loci delicti remains general rule in New
York); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (N.Y. 1972) (listing set of rules amounting
to common domicile exception to lex loci delicti rule); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279,
283-85 (1963) (rationalizing result both in terms of "center of gravity" and "interests").
90. See, e.g., Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453, 456-69 (Ark. 1977)
(combining Leflar's approach with Second Restatement).
91. Kay, supra note 3, at 585.
92. See infra Table II.
93. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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courts striking out on their own.4 For this reason, some commentators
have suggested that choice-of-law surveys should be limited to state court
decisions. 95 I decided, however, to include the federal court cases for a
number of reasons. First, although federal courts occasionally do depart
from the state precedents, in most cases they eventually return to the fold.9
In many respects the task of a federal court hearing a diversity case replicates
the task of a lower state court." Second, by virtue of the interstate character
of choice-of-law cases, a large number of them qualify for diversity juris-
diction and are likely to wind up in federal court either as an original
matter98 or after removal." Ignoring the federal court cases, therefore,
would greatly decrease the size of the data base. Third, compiling the federal
cases separately allowed for an evaluation of the degree to which the federal
courts are able to emulate their state court counterparts.
For states that still follow the First Restatement, I compiled all cases
from 1960-the approximate date of the commencement of the conflicts
revolution-to the present. For states that follow one of the new approaches,
I compiled all cases beginning with the departure from the First Restatement.
For several reasons I included only torts cases. First, tort litigation was
indubitably the conflicts revolution's principal battlefield.' °° Second, the new
theories have their principal application in tort cases. Although most states
follow the same approach in tort and contract cases,' 0' in practice frequent
use of choice-of-law clauses and recourse to arbitration have diminished the
need to apply any conflicts approach.in many contract cases. 02 Outside the
tort and contact areas, the traditional rules have been less affected by the
revolution. 03 Third, evaluating the results that the theories are likely to
generate is easier in tort cases. Of course, occasionally it is not obvious
whether a case should be classified as tort, contract, or something else.'t 4
In doubtful cases I erred on the side of inclusion.
94. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren., 475 F.2d 438, 442 (2d Cir.) (distinguishing New
York's Neumeler decision in order to apply forum law allowing full recovery), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 856 (1973).
95. Kay, supra note 59, at 184-85.
96. See, e.g., Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of P.R.C., 923 F.2d 957,
963 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying Chinese wrongful death damage limitation because situs of
accident was in China and rejecting Rosenthal approach).
97. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL CotuRTs 373-74 (4th ed. 1983).
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) (authorizing federal court subject matter jurisdiction
for actions between citizens of different states).
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988) (authorizing removal of most cases from state court
that qualify for original federal court subject matter jurisdiction).
100. DE BOER, supra note 3, at 8-397 n.2.
101. There are some counterexamples. West Virginia, for instance, follows the traditional
approach in tort cases, but a "grouping of contacts" approach in contract matters. See Paul
v. National Life Ins. Co., 352 S.E.2d 550, 555-56 (W.Va. 1986).
102. Cf. Juenger, supra note 4, at 307.
103. ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 70, at xvii.
104. See, e.g., Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 702 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1985).
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I excluded cases in which the choice of law was mandated by statute
rather than the state's choice-of-law theory. Most commonly, this occurred
with borrowing statutes'015 and workers' compensation statutes. 1' 6 I excluded
these cases because how a court interprets a statute such as a borrowing
statute reveals relatively little about how it approaches choice of law
generally. The study ultimately yielded a total data base of 802 decisions.
Finally, once the cases were assembled I examined them to make three
determinations. First, I determined whether the court chose the forum rule
or a foreign rule.
Second, of the rules competing for application, I determined whether
the court chose a rule that favored recovery or a rule that did not. I made
this determination as a relative matter. For instance, a statute allowing
wrongful death recovery up to fifty-thousand dollars does allow for some
recovery, but it is certainly not a "recovery-favoring" rule when juxtaposed
with a rule allowing unlimited recovery. 07 In such cases, I treated the rule
allowing unlimited recovery as the "prorecovery rule" and the fifty-thousand
dollar limitation as the "nonrecovery rule."
Third, to the extent possible, I determined whether the court chose a
rule that favored a local party over a nonlocal party, or vice versa. I treated
as "local" individuals domiciled in the forum state and business associations
whose business activities were centered in the state. In many cases no such
determination was possible. For instance, if both parties were locall°s or
both parties were nonlocal"09 a court obviously could not favor a local party
over a nonlocal party, or vice versa.
Table II shows the results of the study state by state:
TABLE II - TOTAL RESULTS
State Approach Forum Law Recovery Law Local Favoring
State Fed. State Fed. State Fed.
Alabama First Rest. 0/4 1/2 1/4 0/2 1/2 1/2
Alaska Second Rest. 2/2 0/0 2/2 0/0 1/1 0/0
(1968)
Arizona Second Rest. 8/10 0/0 9/10 0/0 3/3 0/0
(1968)
Arkansas Leflar (1977) 2/4 0/1 4/4 0/1 1/1 0/0
105. See, e.g., Makarow v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 403 N.W.2d 563 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987).
106. See, e.g., Jansen v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 566 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991).
107. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
108. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).






























































Forum Law Recovery Law Local Favoring
State Fed. State
13/21 11/18 14/2 1
Fed. State
12/18 7/14
2/3 7/13 3/3 9/13
1/2 2/5 1/2 3/5






5/14 12/22 7/14 11/22 4/7 5/7
9/16 5/9 11/16 6/9 6/10 4/5
4/7 5/12 4/7 6/12 0/0
1/1 3/4 0/1 2/4 0/0
2/4 0/0 1/4 0/0 0/0











1/3 4/7 0/3 3/7 0/3 3/6
2/2 3/3 2/2 3/3 1/1 2/2
9/11 10/17 5/11 6/17 5/9
2/2 3/7 2/2 5/7 1/1 2/4
0/9 4/8 2/9 2/8 0/0 4/6
2/2 6/9 1/2 4/9 1/1 4/9
3/3 2/5 3/3 1/5 1/2 2/4
110. Effective January 1, 1992, Louisiana adopted a statute codifying and altering in
some respects its choice-of-law approach. Act No. 923, 1991 La. Sess. Law. Serv. 1693. All
cases were collected before the effective date of the new law. For a discussion of the Louisiana
statute, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law on Choice of Law: An Exegesis,
66 TuL. L. REv. 677 (1992).











New Hampshire Leflar (1966)
New Jersey Intrst. Anal.
(1967)











































The left-hand column of Table II shows the approach followed by the
state. In the event that the state has abandoned the First Restatement, the
Forum Law Recovery Law Local Favoring
State Fed. State Fed. State Fed.
7/10 6/7 10/10 4/7 5/5 3/5
2/4 3/14 2/4 2/14 0/0 1/7
8/11 2/5 8/11 3/5 4/4 0/1
0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
0/1 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0 0/0
0/0 6/6 0/0 2/6 0/0 2/4
6/8 3/5 5/8 3/5 1/2 1/2
11/17 9/17 12/17 9/17 5/6 4/8
1/3 0/0 1/3 0/0 0/0 0/0
38/68 34/62 46/68 31/62 18/25 20/36
3/16 1/6 7/16 1/6 3/4 0/2
2/4 0/1 0/4 0/1 0/0 0/0
5/8 9/14 4/8 6/14 3/3 7/9
1/2 5/6 2/2 5/6 1/1 1/1
4/8 3/4 3/8 3/4 1/4 2/2
8/16 15/28 7/16 13/28 2/4 10/18
3/7 4/6 5/7 4/6 3/5 0/2
2/5 2/5 2/5 2/5 2/3 0/1
1/3 0/0 2/3 0/0 0/1 0/0
0/2 2/8 0/2 3/8 0/0 2/5
5/7 9/16 6/7 10/16 4/5 4/6
0/1 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0
0/2 0/2 1/2 0/2 0/0 0/0
0/1 6/7 0/1 1/7 0/0 0/2
4/6 2/4 3/6 2/4 1/4 0/1
2/5 0/2 4/5 1/2 2/3 1/2
8/10 5/10 8/10 6/10 2/2 3/5
0/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 0/0 0/0
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date of abandonment is shown parenthetically. The pair of columns to the
right of that column shows-separately for state and federal courts-the
fraction of times that courts applied forum law. For instance, if state courts
applied forum law in five out of eight cases, the entry under the state
portion of that column is "5/8." The pair of columns to the right of those
entries-again separating state and federal courts-shows the fraction of
times that courts applied the law favoring recovery. Finally, the right-hand
pair of columns shows the fraction of times that courts have favored local
over nonlocal parties. The total numbers in this column are lower because
many conflicts cases do not present a choice between local and nonlocal
parties."' The next step in the analysis was to group the states into the
major theoretical groupings: The First Restatement (fifteen states),"12 the
Second Restatement (twenty-four states)," 3 interest analysis (four states) ' 4
and Leflar's choice-influencing considerations (five states)., 5
111. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (noting cases presenting no choice
between favoring local or nonlocal parties).
112. As shown'in Table II, these states are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.
113. As shown in Table II these states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Utah and Washington. Four of these states-the District of Columbia, Louisiana,
Pennsylvania and Oregon-were all among the 11 problematic jurisdictions discussed above.
See supra text accompanying note 92. In each case, the problem is that the states combine
interest analysis with the Second Restatement's approach. See, e.g., Taylor v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 579 So. 2d 443 (La. 1991); Dunkwu v. Neville, 575 A.2d 293 (D.C. 1990); Guy v.
Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Schriber, 625 P.2d 1370 (Or.
Ct. App. 1981). In each case, however, I concluded that the decisions most often relied on
Second Restatement factors, and that if "interests" were discussed, they were subsumed within
the "significant relationship" factors. North Dakota, which purports to subscribe to a "center
of gravity" theory, follows an approach quite similar to the Second Restatement. See, e.g.,
Vigen Constr. Co. v. Millers Nat'l Ins. Co., 436 N.W.2d 254, 257 (N.D. 1989) (citing Second
Restatement in course of "center of gravity" analysis in contract case). In any event, the
number of conflicts cases decided by the North Dakota courts is quite small.
114. As shown in Table II these states are California, Hawaii, Massachusetts and New
Jersey. Two of these states-Hawaii and Massachusetts-were among the 11 problematic
jurisdictions discussed above. See supra text accompanying note 92. However, examination of
the opinions of these states convinced me that they primarily rely on an evaluation of the
state interests in a manner fairly similar to that proposed by Currie. See, e.g., Peters v. Peters,
634 P.2d 586, 593 (Haw. 1981) (approving of mode of looking at interest and policies). The
court noted that "the preferred analysis, in our opinion, would be an assessment of the
interests and policy factors involved with a purpose of arriving at a desirable result in each
situation." Id.; see, e.g.,'Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358 N.E.2d 416, 417 (Mass. 1976) (purporting
to retain lex loci delicti as basic rule, but applying Massachusetts law-the law of common
domicile of parties). The court used this law because a state "has no legitimate interest in
regulating the inter-spousal relationships of Massachusetts domiciliaries who chance to be
injured within its borders." Id.
115. As shown in Table II these states are Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island and Wisconsin. Two of these states-Arkansas and Rhode Island-were among the 11
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This left three states unclassified. Two of them, Kentucky" 6 and Mi-
chigan," 7 exercise a blunt forum law preference that requires separate
categorization. The remaining state, New York, defies classification. New
York, of course, was the revolution's first battleground and initially adopted
the "center of gravity" metaphor."8 In many respects it is tempting to
lump New York with the Second Restatement states because of the similar-
ities between the center of gravity theory and the "most signficant relation-
ship" test. Additionally, it is clear that many New York developments
directly affected the Second Restatement." 9 Tempting as this might be for
sake of simplicity, however, it will not suffice for analytical purposes. The
shifting sands of New York's approaches do not allow for pigeonholing.
After coining the "center of gravity" metaphor, the New York Court of
Appeals adopted a set of rules amounting to a common domicile exception
to the lex loci delicti rule.' 20 More recently, the New York Court of Appeals
has variously described its approach as being generally one of lex loci 2'
and one of interest analysis.'2 All of this makes clear that New York
requires separate treatment. I therefore organized the data as follows:
TABLE III-TOTALs BY APPROACH
First Second Intrst. Leflar New Lex Fori
Rest. Rest. Anal. York
Forum 45/129 202/364 56/89 44/68 72/130 10/13
Total
Forum %1o 35±8 55±5 63±10 65±11 55±9 77±23
Rcvry 47/129 194/364 54/89 49/68 77/130 9/13
Total
Rcvry % 36±8 53±5 61±10 72±11 59±9 69±25
Local 24/54 106/170 31/51 19/29 36/61 6/9
Total
Local 0V0 44±13 62±7 61±13 66±17 59±12 67±31
Table III, therefore, shows the total for each approach, grouping the
problematic jurisdictions discussed above. See supra text accompanying note 92. Examination of
opinions from these states, however, convinced me that they most closely adhere to Leflar's
approach. See, e.g., Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Ark. 1987)
(applying all five of Leflar's factors including "better law" consideration); Brown v. Church of
the Holy Name of Jesus, 252 A.2d 176, 178-82 (R.I. 1969) (examining all five of Leflar's
considerations).
116. Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
117. Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1982).
118. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282 (N.Y. 1963). "
119. Compare Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792, 794 (N.Y. 1965) (placing emphasis on
place of formation of relationship between parties) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 145(2)(d) (1977) (stating that one of factors in evaluating most significant relationship
in torts is place of formation of relationship between parties).
120. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457 (N.Y. 1972).
121. Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. 1978).
122. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 683 (N.Y. 1985).
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states as discussed above. The figures following the plus or minus symbol
are the confidence intervals generated by the results. Using the accepted
formula for binary statistics,' 3 I calculated the 95% confidence interval.
The confidence interval assesses the statistical significance of the results.
For instance, as shown in Table III, First Restatement jurisdictions applied
forum law in 45 out of 129 cases. This yielded a percentage of 35 plus or
minus 8, meaning that one can state with 95% confidence that the true
value is between 27% and 43%.
Finally, I separated the data by state and federal decisions. Employing
the same error formula, Table IV shows these values:
TABLE IV- COMPARISON OF STATE AND FEDERAL APPLICATION 124
First Rest. Second Rest. Intrst. Anal. Leflar New York
State Fed. State Fed. State Fed. State Fed. State Fed.
Forum 14/62 32/66 93/164 109/200 27/41 29/48 26/39 18/29 38/68 34/62
Total
Forum %23±10 48±12 57±8 55±7 66±15 60±14 67±15 62±18 56±12 57±12
Rcvry 25/62 22/66 93/164 101/200 27/41 27/48 32/39 17/29 48/68 31/62
Total
Rcvry % 40±12 33±11 57±8 51±7 66±15 56±14 82±13 59±18 68±11 50±12
Local 8/16 16/38 41/66 63/104 13/21 18/30 12/15 7/14 18/25 20/36
Total
Local % 50±25 42±16 62±12 61±9 62±21 60±18 80±20 50±26 72±18 56±16
123. Each test upon .the cases allowed for only two possibilities. For instance, the
examination of each case determined whether the case applied forum or foreign law, which,
of course, allows for only two possibilities. Thus, the statistics are binary. The accepted
formula for calculating the 95% confidence interval for binary statistics is 1.96 times the
square root of ((y x (1 - y))/n), where "y" is equal to the ratio generated by the sample and
"n" is the total number of samples. See, e.g., DAVID K. HIn.EBRANT & LYmAN OTr, STATISTICAL
TmN a FOR MANAGERS 231 (2d ed. 1987). The 95% confidence interval is the traditionally
accepted measure of statistical significance in social statistics. HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL
STATISTICS 208-11 (rev. 2d ed. 1979). Applying the formula, to take an example, the sample
for application of forum law by the First Restatement generated a ratio of 45/129, which
equals .348. Thus, multiplying "y" (which equals .348) times "l-y" (which equals .652) results
in a product of .227. Dividing this by "n" (which equals 129) and taking the square root
equals .042. Finally, multiplying by .196 results in a confidence interval of .08. Thus, the
result reported in the table is 35 ± 8%. All other confidence intervals were calculated in the
same manner and are reported in Tables III and IV. A recent empirical study of the tendency
of courts to pierce the corporate veil made the same assumptions regarding the binary nature
of the statistics. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CoRNE.x L. REv. 1036, 1049 n.77 (1991).
124. The small size and uniformity of the decisions in the lexfori states made it impossible
to calculate meaningful confidence intervals. For that reason, those results are not reported in
Table IV. In any event, the results did not show any statistically signficant deviations between
state and federal decisions in the lex fori states.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Before proceeding to a discussion of what the results show, it is
important to note some of the data's inherent limitations. First, the data
include only reported cases. There are, of course, practical reasons for this.
Combing trial court records for unreported multistate cases would be a
monumental undertaking.125 However, the fact that I considered only re-
ported cases might distort the data because, in general, only cases that are
"important" or address unresolved questions qualify for publication.
126
Several considerations, however, convince me that this is not a substan-
tial problem. First, all states were subject to the same mode of analysis,
and all reported decisions were collected for each state. If one takes the
data as a relative evaluation of the tendencies of the methodologies, rather
than an absolute evaluation of the methodologies, the data are meaningful
because the statistics were gathered in the same manner for each state.
Second, the evaluations made in Part I are relative. Although interest
analysis, if taken seriously, should favor forum law more often than the
First Restatement, it is not clear whether this means that interest analysis
should favor forum law in an ascertainable percentage of the cases. Third,
the inclusion of reported trial court decisions reduces the absolute distortion
because the sample is not therefore entirely appellate opinions. 127
A second potential limitation is the finite size of the data base. Although
some of the conflicts approaches, most notably the Second Restatement,
have generated huge numbers of cases, others have generated fewer. Smaller
data bases lead to larger confidence intervals, thus reducing the usefulness
of the results.'2 I endeavored, however, to generate the largest possible
sample population by examining all reported cases.
Finally, there is room for debate as to the conflicts methodology that
some of the states follow. In particular, the eleven problematic states
presented difficult issues of classification. 2 9 I have attempted to minimize
125. Cf. CuPRm, supra note 7, at 589 (stating that examining unindexed trial court records
is "not my dish of tea").
126. See, e.g., 9TH CIR. R. 36-2 (setting standards for publication of cases). The Rule
states that a disposition qualifies for publication "only if it ... establishes, alters, modifies
or clarifies a rule of law, or ... [c]alls attention to a rule of law which appears to have been
generally overlooked, or ... [c]riticizes existing law, or ... [i]nvolves a legal or factual issue
of unique interest or substantial public importance ... ." Id. Others have noted the potentially
nonrepresentative character of reported cases. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 2-3 (1984); Peter Siegelman &
John J. Donohue, Studying the Iceberg From Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and
Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & Soc'y Rnv. 1133 (1990).
127. Cf. Solimine, supra note 11, at 82-86 (explaining decision to use only appellate
cases); see also supra note 11 (noting agreement with Solimine's data).
128. This, of course, is because the size of the confidence interval is inversely proportional
to the square root of the total number of samples. See supra note 123. This formula confirms
the intuitively obvious proposition that the statistical value of a study increases with the size
of the sample population.
129. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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this problem by carefully examining the decisions to find the dominant
strain in each state's conflicts approach. In any event, as the state-by-state
breakdown shows, the overall effect of these problematic states was slight.
Thus, even if one were to disagree with my classification of some of the
states, it is unlikely that it would significantly change the conclusions of
the study.
Several conclusions that can be drawn from the data stand out. The
first conclusion is that the great divide in American choice of law is still
between the First Restatement and everything else. With respect to the
degree to which the competing methodologies favor forum law, only the
First Restatement shows a statistically significant variation from the other
approaches. The confidence interval for the First Restatement for this
variable is 28% to 44%. This confidence interval does not overlap with the
intervals for the Second Restatement (50% to 60%), interest analysis (53%
to 73%), Leflar (54% to 76%) or New York (46% to 64%).
Similarly, the First Restatement shows a statistically significant propen-
sity to apply recovery-favoring rules less often. The confidence interval for
this variable for the First Restatement is 28% to 44%. Again, this confidence
interval does not overlap with the confidence intervals for the Second
Restatement (48% to 58%), interest analysis (51% to 71%), Leflar (61%
to 82%) or New York (50% to 68%).
The picture is somewhat foggier with respect to the propensity of the
approaches to favor local parties. Although the First Restatement's confi-
dence interval is the lowest (31% to 57%), because of the smaller number
of samples it overlaps with the confidence intervals for the Second Restate-
ment (55% to 69%), interest analysis (48% to 74%), Leflar (49% to 83%)
and New York (47% to 71%). However, lumping all of the modern
approaches together yields a composite confidence interval of 57% to 67% ,130
which approaches a statistically significant variance from the First Restate-
ment. Thus, although the picture is less clear, the First Restatement is
probably the least generous to locals.
In one important respect, therefore, the data confirms the tentative
hypothesis advanced above: The First Restatement is the most evenhanded
of the approaches and courts appear to take it fairly seriously. Territorial
connecting factors do not favor forum law, prorecovery rules or local
parties. In practice, therefore, it appears that the First Restatement works
much as one would expect.
The corollary to the proposition that the First Restatement is statistically
distinguishable from the new approaches is that the new approaches are
not, by and large, distinguishable from each other. With respect to the
application of forum law, all of the major competitors to the First Restate-
ment show a clear overlap. The confidence interval for the Second Restate-
130. The total figure for local parties, lumping all of the non-First Restatement cases
together, is 198/320. Employing the formula discussed above, see supra note 123, yielded a
95% confidence interval of 57% to 67%.
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ment is 50% to 60%, for interest analysis is 53% to 73%, for Leflar is 54%
to 76% and for New York is 46% to 64%. These approaches, therefore, are
statistically indistinguishable in the degree to which they favor forum law.
The picture is a bit different with regard to recovery-favoring rules.
The confidence intervals for this variable for the major competitors to the
First Restatement are: Second Restatement: 48% to 58%; interest analysis:
51% to 71%; Leflar: 61% to 83%; and New York: 45% to 63%. These
intervals show that in this respect the Second Restatement and Leflar's
approach are statistically distinguishable from each other, but neither is
distinguishable from interest analysis or the New York approach.
Finally, with respect to the propensity of these approaches to favor
local parties, no statistically significant variations could be detected. The
confidence intervals here for the major new approaches are: Second Re-
statement: 55% to 67%; interest analysis: 48% to 74%; Leflar: 49% to
83%; and New York: 47% to 71%. All of these intervals overlap.
It follows, therefore, that the new approaches do not work as they
should. With respect to the propensity to favor forum law, interest analysis
and Leflar's approach apparently should favor forum law more often than
the Second Restatement. The data do not bear this out because there are
no statistically significant variations among the new theories.
With respect to the propensity to favor victims, Leflar's approach ought
to be the most prorecovery, followed by interest analysis and the Second
Restatement. Although Leflar's choice-influencing considerations do show
a statistically significantly greater bent toward prorecovery rules than the
Second Restatement, the results produced by interest analysis and the New
York approach are statistically indistinguishable from those in Leflar and
Second Restatement jurisdictions.
With respect to the propensity to favor local parties, interest analysis
ought to point more strongly in this direction than Leflar's approach or
the Second Restatement. The data do not confirm this, however. The new
approaches are statistically indistinguishable in this regard.
On the matter of whether federal courts faithfully adhere to their home
state's method, the data reveal little to suggest that they do not. All but one
of the confidence intervals for each of the approaches overlap. In First
Restatement cases, the confidence interval for application of forum law by
state courts is 13% to 33%, while the same interval for federal courts is 36%
to 60%. This deviation may be aberrational, however, because in other respects
the state and federal court decisions applying the First Restatement are quite
consistent. With respect to application of prorecovery rules, the state confidence
interval is 28% to 52%, while the federal confidence interval is 22% to 44%.
With respect to favoring local parties, the state confidence interval is 25% to
75%, while the federal confidence interval is 24% to 680o.
The most frequently cited example of state and federal courts going
opposite directions is New York.' At one time, the New York federal
131. See, e.g., Cooperman v. Sumnark Indus. Div. of Sun Oil Co., 529 F. Supp. 365,
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courts appeared to follow a methodology that more closely mimicked
California's interest analysis than New York's approach.1 2 Eventually,
however, the New York federal courts returned to the fold, 3 3 and the data
reveal no statistically significant variations between the state and federal
courts in New York. Taking the New York results alone, with respect to
application of forum law the confidence interval for the state courts is 44%
to 68%, while the interval for federal courts is 45% to 69%. For application
of prorecovery rules the confidence interval for state courts is 57% to 79%,
while the interval for federal courts is 38% to 62%. For application of
rules favoring local parties, the confidence interval for state courts is 54%
to 90%, while the interval for federal courts is 40% to 72%. All of these
intervals overlap, and, thus, one cannot detect variations between the New
York federal courts and the state courts. Accordingly, taken as a whole the
results suggest that federal courts are fulfilling their duty under Klaxon'3
to follow the lead of their state court counterparts.
What, then, can one say about the present and future of choice of law
given the data? One thing is clear: The tentative hypothesis advanced above
must be, as I suggested, at least partially incorrect. Courts do not take the
new approaches seriously. Because all of the competitors to the First
Restatement start from different analytical premises, if courts were faithful
to their tenets they would inevitably generate different result patterns. Yet
in practice the outcomes are largely indistinguishable.
None of this is really surprising. Although interest analysis purports to
rely predominantly on domiciliary contacts, the notion of what counts as
an "interest" is so uncertain that even territorial contacts can be rationalized
with fictions such as the need to protect medical creditors who provide care
at the situs of an accident. 35 The Second Restatement still relies on territorial
contacts, but the unweighted, open-ended nature of its factors allows for
the rationalization of almost any result." 6 New York's approach is so
thoroughly muddled that it is doubtful that even a court sincerely attempting
to follow the Court of Appeals' precedents could do so.137 Leflar's approach
is dominated by the better law determinant and never has purported to be
much of a check on judicial discretion.
3
The reason, then, that all of the modern approaches perform nearly
identically in practice is that none of them is much of a check on judicial
368 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that there exists discrepancy between views of New York Court
of Appeals and Second Circuit on conflicts standards forum).
132. Compare Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973) with Neumeier v.
Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
133. Barkanic v. General Admin. of CAAC, 923 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1991).
134. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
135. CuRRi, supra note 7, at 366, 369-70.
136. DE BoaiR, supra note 3, at 3-225.
137. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Juenger, supra note 4, at 219. Juenger observed that "judicial discretion
in conflicts cases [that follow Leflar] is near absolute." Id.
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discretion. No other hypothesis can account for the similarity in result
patterns. If the new theories actually curtailed judicial discretion, their
differing analytical foundations ought to produce quite different result
patterns.
What is it, then, that courts do take seriously in deciding multistate
cases? While there is no absolutely rigorous manner of demonstrating exactly
what motivates judges applying the new theories, the primary motivation
seems to be fair substantive results. Several considerations support this
conclusion.
The first consideration is the strong prorecovery bent all of the new
theories evince in application. Although this bent is apparent on the face
of Leflar's theory, it is less so with interest analysis and not at all with the
Second Restatement.13 9 This speaks volumes on the propensity of judges to
seek out desirable results even in the face of arguably contrary conflicts
theories.
The second consideration is the strong tendency of courts to break
from the lex loci delicti rule to avoid an undesirable result, such as the
application of a guest statute, 40 spousal or intrafamilial immunity,' 4' a
damage limitation 42  or other undesirable and anachronistic tort
139. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
140. See First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 319-20 (Colo. 1973) (finding that
Colorado rule of full recovery applied instead of lex loci's aircraft guest statute); DeMayer v.
Maxwell, 647 P.2d 783, 784-85 (Id. 1982) (concluding that Idaho rule of full recovery applied
instead of lex loci's guest statute); Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 112-13 (Ky. 1968)
(explaining that Kentucky rule of full compensation applied instead of Ohio guest statute);
Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610, 616-17 (Me. 1970) (finding that Maine rule of full recovery
applied instead of lex loci's guest statute); Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 412-15 (Minn.
1973) (applying Minnesota rule of full recovery instead of lex loci's guest statute); Kennedy v.
Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 184-85 (Mo. 1969) (finding that Missouri rule of full recovery applied
instead of lex loci's guest statute); Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966) (finding that
New Hampshire rule of full recovery applied instead of lex loci's guest statute); Mellk v.
Sarahson, 229 A.2d 625, 629 (N.J. 1967) (finding that New Jersey rule of full recovery applied
instead of lex loc's guest statute); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. 1963)
(finding that New York rule of full recovery applied instead of lex loci's guest statute); Wilcox
v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408, 416-17 (Wis. 1965) (finding that Wisconsin rule of full recovery
applied instead of lex loci's rule of full recovery); cf. Fuerste v. Benis, 156 N.W.2d 831, 934-
35 (Iowa 1968) (finding that Iowa guest statute applied instead of lex loci's rule of full
recovery).
141. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Alaska 1968) (applying Alaska
rule of full recovery instead of lex loci's rule of spousal immunity); Jagers v. Royal Indem.
Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 315 (La. 1973) (applying Louisiana rule of full recovery instead of lex
loci's alleged rule of intrafamilial immunity); Forsman v. Forsman, 799 P.2d 218, 221 (Utah
1989) (applying California rule of full recovery instead of lex loci's rule of spousal immunity);
cf. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 440 P.2d 326, 328-28 (Ariz. App. 1968) (applying Arizona rule of
spousal immunity); Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586, 594-95 (Haw. 1981) (applying Hawaii rule
of spousal immunity); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358 N.E.2d 416, 418 (Mass. 1976) (applying
Massachusetts rule but abrogating spousal immunity retroactively).
142. See Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 731 (Cal. 1967) (applying rule of full recovery
instead of lex loci's rule of $25,000 wrongful death limitation); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519
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rules. 143 In fact, the truly striking feature of the thirty-six cases in which
courts have made the initial decision to abandon the First Restatement is
that in twenty-six of these cases courts did so to apply a demonstrably
superior tort rule, while in only six of the cases have courts applied an
inferior tort rule, and in another four cases the impact of the decision was
unclear144 Taking as a subset of total cases those cases in which courts
have departed from the First Restatement and the impact of the decision
has been clear, courts applied the prorecovery rule in 82 ± 14 % of the
cases. This confidence interval is statistically significantly greater than the
composite tendency of courts applying the modern theories to apply pro-
recovery rules. Taking together all of the modern decisions, courts have
applied prorecovery rules in 383 of 664 cases, yielding a confidence interval
of 58 ± 4 %, which is below the confidence interval for the subset. Even
beyond the strong prorecovery bent of the cases abandoning the First
A.2d 13, 25 (Conn. 1986) (applying Connecticut rule of full recovery instead of lex loci's
severely limited government fund compensation); Traveler's Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38,
48 (Del. 1991) (applying Delaware rule of full recovery instead of lex loci's severely limited
government fund compensation); Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 267 N.E.2d 405, 409
(Ohio) (applying Ohio rule of full recovery instead of lex loci's rule of $30,000 wrongful death
damage limitation), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632, 638
(Okla. 1974) (applying Oklahoma wrongful death law instead of lex loci's severely limited
compensation); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 807 (Pa. 1964) (applying
Pennsylvania rule of full recovery instead of lex loci's rule severely limiting wrongful death
compensation); Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917, 923-24 (R.I.) (applying Rhode Island's
rule of full recovery instead of lex loci's limited recovery), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957
(1968); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 319 (Tex. 1979) (remanding for probable
application of Texas law of full recovery instead of lex loci's rule severely limiting compen-
sation); cf. Tramontana v. S. A. Empresa de Viacoa Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468, 471
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (applying Brazil's $170 wrongful death limitation), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943
(1966); Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593, 596-97 (11. 1970) (finding that plaintiff was to rely
on Illinois wrongful death statute instead of Iowa wrongful death statute; unclear as to
differences between statutes).
143. See Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453, 458 (Ark. 1977) (applying
Arkansas comparative negligence rule instead of lex loci's contributory negligence rule); Futch
v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 391 So. 2d 808, 809-10 (Fla. 1980) (applying Florida rule of
comparative negligence instead of lex locis rule of contributory negligence); Sexton v. Ryder
Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843, 854 (Mich. 1982) (applying Michigan rule of imputed
owner liability instead of lex loci's rule of nonliability); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509,
513-14 (Miss. 1968) (applying Mississippi rule of comparative negligence instead of lex locis
rule of contributory negligence); Werner v. Werner, 526 P.2d 370, 376-77 (Wash. 1974)
(applying California rule of tort liability for notaries); cf. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515
N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1987) (applying Indiana rule allowing absolute defense for openly
dangerous products instead of lex loci's rule of partial defense); Harper v. Silva, 399 N.W.2d
826, 830 (Neb. 1987) (recognizing that it was unclear whether court has previously departed
from lex loci rule; opinion in response to certification from federal court; decision not to
apply Nebraska excess medical malpractice insurance fund; unclear as to impact of decision);
Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 755-56 (N.D. 1972) (applying North Dakota rule of
contributory negligence instead of lex locis rule of comparative negligence); Casey v. Manson
Constr. & Eng'g Co., 428 P.2d 898, 907-08 (Or. 1967) (applying Washington rule not allowing
recovery for loss of consortium).
144. See supra notes 140-43.
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Restatement is the striking fact that the huge fraction of this subset follows
the Babcock pattern: the lex loci delicti rule pointed to a highly undesirable
tort rule such as a guest statute or a damage limitation, and the new theories
gave courts the wiggle room to apply a preferable tort rule.
45
While Leflar's theory, interest analysis, and the Second Restatement
have been well-known for decades, courts suddenly find religion at precisely
the moment when the new theories will help them avoid a bad result. The
unavoidable inference is that such epiphanies have much to do with the the
substantive result reached and little to do with the theories themselves. 146 It
is quite unlikely that those motivations, so apparent at first, disappear and
allow the courts to apply the new theories in a manner dispassionate to
results in subsequent cases.
The third consideration blends into the second. All of the new ap-
proaches are extraordinarily malleable. Judges and justices are in the busi-
ness of dispensing justice to the real parties that litigate before them.
Because nearly every case under the new theories is fairly debatable, it
defies credulity to think that those who sit in judgment, and face counsel
and the parties directly, can be or are blind to the outcomes of their
decisions. As one commentator has observed, "The real clash is between a
result-conscious judiciary and scholars who are committed to one or the
other conflicts orthodoxy."'
1 47
This survey demonstrates that choice of law in the United States is at
a crossroads. If, as I suggest, the new theories usually amount to little more
than long-winded excuses to do what courts wanted to do in the first place,
one may ask whether the current state of affairs is satisfactory. It seems to
me that counsel, courts and parties would be better off if judges would
admit candidly-as do courts in states that follow Leflar's approach'
4 8-
that substantive preferences control results in multistate cases.
The costs of obfuscating the real desiderata in choice-of-law cases are
high. Honesty is the best policy, even in judicial opinions, 49 because
dishonesty has discernable negative effects. For one, it makes it difficult to
advise clients. Although lifelong observers of American choice-of-law deci-
sions may be able to detect that most recent cases can be explained by a
desire to apply prorecovery, forum rules, 50 practicing lawyers who research
these cases only occasionally are much more likely to be taken in by the
145. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
146. Friedrich K. Juenger, Governmental Interests and Multistate Justice: A Reply to
Professor Sedler, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 227, 238 (1990); see also Paul v. National Life Ins.
Co., 352 S.E.2d 550, 551-52 (W. Va. 1986).
147. Juenger, supra note 4, at 254.
148. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 12-13 (Minn. 1981) (finding that
Iowa survival rule is better rule than Minnesota's rule of nonsurvival of tort liability).
149. Leflar, supra note 9, at 300. Leflar noted that "we do not like it when there is less
than the appearance of intellectual integrity in the process, and we ask that the process be
purified as soon as possible." Id.
150. Willis L.M. Reese, Book Review, 33 AM. J. Corm,. L. 332, 335 (1985).
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highly abstract, "quasi-objective drivel about policies and interests"'' that
permeates current judicial opinions. Moreover, the resources of counsel and
the judiciary would be better directed toward discussing the real issues
instead of articulating fine-spun theories that befuddle the practicing bar
and, in some cases, lower courts.'52 No doubt, we would be better off if
courts actually informed us as to the true basis for their decisions. If, as I
suggest, the real issue in conflicts cases is the relative merits of the rules,
counsel and lower courts are likely to be of much more help to higher
courts if they are pointed in the right direction.
The alternatives to candidly admitting that results are the major deter-
minant in multistate tort cases are clear. One alternative is to retreat to a
regime of reasonably hard and fast rules such as the First Restatement.
Although such a regime produces many unpalatable results,' at least it has
the relative virtues of candor and clarity. The other alternative is to remain
in the shadowy netherworld in which most of American conflicts now
dwells. In this netherworld, substantive preferences are always just out of
sight, influencing the discussion of mysterious concepts such as "interests"
and "significant relationships," but never quite showing themselves. What
direction American choice of law will ultimately take is a chapter that is
yet unwritten. I would suggest that the best of the available alternatives is
to admit candidly that results have been and are the guiding light in
multistate tort cases, and the sooner we get on with it the better.
CONCLUSION
As Robert Leflar said over a decade ago, United States choice of law
truly is a "well-watered plateau.' 5 4 The four dominant approaches toward
choice of law in the United States-the First Restatement, the Second
Restatement, interest analysis and Leflar's choice-influencing considera-
tions-all proceed from different analytical foundations. While the First
Restatement, and to a lesser extent the Second Restatement, emphasizes
territorial connecting factors, interest analysis relies predominantly on dom-
iciliary contacts, and Leflar's approach relies on substantive results. Given
this, one would expect all four of the approaches to generate different result
patterns with respect to the degree to which they favor forum law, prore-
covery rules and local parties. Yet, after surveying 802 cases and applying
accepted modes of statistical analysis, my conclusion is that only the First
Restatement stands apart from the others. In practice the Second Restate-
151. DE BOER, supra note 3, at 8-456.
152. See, e.g., Fisher v. Huck, 624 P.2d 177, 178 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (applying Second
Restatement is "like skeet shooting with a bow and arrow").
153. See, e.g., Alabama Great S. R. R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 809 (Ala. 1892)
(applying Mississippi fellow servant rule to bar recovery by Alabama plaintiff against Alabama
defendant, even though tortious conduct occurred in Alabama, because injury was ultimately
suffered in Mississippi).
154. Leflar, supra note 15, at 10.
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ment, interest analysis and Leflar's approach are largely indistinguishable.
The factor that explains this similarity is that none of the modern theories
acts as a substantial check on judicial discretion. In practice, courts appear
to reach their preferred substantive results, and-except for Leflar's theory
that allows courts to admit their substantive preferences-the new theories
are little more than veils for the real reasoning of courts. As a consequence,
choice of law in the United States is at the crossroads. Either we can admit
that results are the primary determinant in multistate torts cases, or we can
retreat to a regime resembling the First Restatement. In my view, the
preferable road is for us to get on with the business of admitting that
results are important.
